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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
VIOLA FOGLE WILSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
- v.-
MARCEL FEUX WILSON, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No. 8434 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 21, 1955, plaintiff filed an action for divorce on 
the ground of mental .cruelty, after having been married to 
defendant ever since the lOth day of March, 1940. Thereupon 
and in due time defendant filed his answer and counterclaim 
also alleging mental ·cruelty as a ground for divorce. Plaintiff 
replied to the counter claim and after obtaining leave of Court 
filed an amended complaint alleging specific acts of ·cruelty. 
The plaintiff served defendant with written interrogatories 
which, inter alia, asked defendant what ·conduct on her part 
had destroyed any love and affection between the parties as 
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charged in defendant's answer to plaintiffs amended complaint. 
(R.l4) Defendant answered the question in substance by stat-
ing plaintiff has procured an abortion and had refused to 
have any children. 
This case was tried in Farmington, September 15, 1955, 
before the Hon. John F. Wahlquist, Judge of the Second Judicial 
District. 
The evidence showed that for fifteen years plaintiff and 
defendant lived happily together without any serious trouble; 
that they never separated (Tr.15); that from time to time defend-
ant sent little remembrances and love notes to plaintiff until 
shortly before the 13th day of March, 1955; On or about the 
13th day of March, 1955, plaintiff and defendant had been out 
to dinner with friends (Tr.4); that defendant was unable to sleep 
and plaintiff, upon inquiring was told by defendant that he 
had fallen in love with one Phyllis Moll and that he wanted a 
divorce in order that he might marry Mrs. Moll. This latter 
testimony was corroborated by defendant himself when on cross 
examination he stated that he anticipated marrying Mrs. Moll 
(Tr.51), that Mrs. Moll had obtained a divorce on March 22nd, 
1955 (Tr.52), and that she was living in the rental unit of de-
fendant's home and that defendant was keeping her. (Tr.53) 
The evidence further showed that plaintiff had gone to the 
doctor concerning the fact that they had not had children; that 
she had had a tubular pregnancy which required an emergency 
operation and thereafter there were no children, although she 
had not avoided having children (Tr.34); that she in fact wanted 
a family. Plaintiff and defendant testified that during the 
fifteen years of their marriage plaintiff and defendant had var-
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ious degrees of financial success and that defendant had earned 
from $80.00 per month up to the time of the divorce when he 
left his employment as a hair stylist to sell real estate; that in 
the short time before the divorce he earned approximately 
$300.00. The Court found defendant capable of earning $250.00 
to $300.00 per month (Tr.55-Findings). 
On the other hand plaintiff testified that she was in poor 
health and incapable of working (Tr.ll); that she is forty five 
years of age and knows no profession or occupation with which 
to maintain herself. 
The Court awarded to plaintiff judgment in the sum of 
$5,000.00 payable at the rate of $50.00 per month without 
interest, in lieu of alimony, stating that "said sum is intended as 
a portion of the allocation of property to the plaintiff and shall 
be . a charge upon the estate of defendant as to any balance 
that should remain should he die prior to the full payment 
thereof." (Tr.33) 
In addition the Court awarded to plaintiff both pieces of 
real property, together with the furniture therein, subject to 
any encumbrances existing. 
The moneys of the parties were accounted for, plaintiff 
showing that she lived on the bank account from ~the 
separation until the time of the decree without · · who 
was then courting Mrs. Moll, paying her anything. The money 
from uranium stock was turned over to defendant's counsel 
after deducting from said amount plaintiff's counsel fees. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Under the smog of verbosity appellant alleges but one 
point on appeal: 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN MAKING ITS PROPERTY AWARD TO RESPONDENT. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court early decided in Reed vs. Reed, 28 Utah 297, 
78 P. 675. (1904} that: 
"The awarding of alimony and fixing the amount thereof 
1are questions the determination of which rests within 
the sound discretion of the bial court; and, unless it 
is rru1de to appear that there 1ws been an abuse of dis-
cretion on the part of the Court in dealing with one or 
both of these questions, its judgment and orders grant-
ing and fixing the alirrwny wiU not be disturbed. In 
determining these questions the amount of property 
owned by the husband, his capabilities and opportuni-
ties for earning money, the health of each, and their 
respective ages, the station in life in which the wife has 
been accustomed to live, and the amount and kind of 
her own property, will be taken into consideration by 
the Court." (Emphasis added.} 
In the case of Blair c. Blair, 40 Utah 306, 121 P.19 (1912), 
this doctrine was reaffirmed. Again, in Adamson v. Adamson 
55 Utah 544, 188 P. 635 (1920), the Court held, .. the granting 
or withholding of alimony in divorce proceeding is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the Court." 
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In Pinney v. Pinney, 66 Utah 612, 245 P. 329 (1926) the 
Court also held: "The division of property in a matter that rests 
largely within the sound discretion of the trial Court. Unless 
it appears from the finding that the division made is not equi-
table under all the circumstances of the case, an appellate Court 
could not and will not disturb the order of the trial Court." 
In the case at bar the only issue is therefore whether or 
not the trial Court did or did not aJbuse its discretion in award-
ing the property to plaintiff in the manner in which it did. 
In deciding this matter of the division of the property the 
Court gave it very careful consideration and made the ruling 
in view of all the circumstances. (See page 57 of transcript.) 
No permanent award of alimony was made so that defen-
dant, who is an able-bodied man- when he wants to be- will 
be able to take his new bride without the burden of maintain-
ing his old one. Thus he can in one hundred convenient 
monthly installments completely shed the responsibility created 
by a marriage of fifteen successful and happy years and acquire 
a new wife in much the same fashion as he might shed his old 
clothes for newer ones. 
It was established that plaintiff had never worked, but 
had devoted her entire time and efforts to making a home for 
defendant. Defendant, on the other hand, consistent with 
his proven lack of character, desires to participate in the prop-
ties without being required to support plaintiff at all. 
There can be no argument that plaintiff was and is blame-
less for what occurred and normally defendant would find 
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himself under the obligation of permanent alimony. ·In this 
case, however, defendant is not satisfied with merely taking 
fifteen years of this plaintiff's life, but now claims he should 
avoid alimony, which he did and in addition have what prop-
erty the parties have received during their marriage. This in-
deed would be a classic illustration of the wandering male's 
being able to successfully eat his cake and have it too. 
We should like to call the Court's attention to this division 
of the property which defendant claims was such an abuse of the 
trial Court's discretion. Plaintiff received the small home on 
3rd West Street in Salt Lake City, purchased originally for not 
more than $2700.00 (Tr.l4) which even on today's inflated 
market, is worth very little either as commercial property or 
as a desirable homesite. The home in Bountiful was awarded 
to plaintiff subject to a mortgage in the sum of $9,352.74 which 
plaintiff must assume. (Tr.lO.) The furniture in the home had 
very little resale value. In addition plaintiff will be required 
to pay taxes and upkeep on these properties with defendant 
only paying $50.00 per month for the next eight years. This is 
not subject to any modification by the Court as indicated by 
the decree. 
Plaintiff also received the balance of the bank account 
which was practically spent by plaintiff to maintain herself from 
the time defendant left home to seek his new matrimonial 
pursuit until the time of trial. During that time he paid 
plaintiff no alimony at all and now wants a division of that 
money on which plaintiff maintained herself for about seven 
months. As to the stocks and the check for them, plaintiff kept 
this intact and the Court ordered the defendant to endorse it 
and plaintiff to cash the same and return the balance to de-
fendant. (Tr.59). 
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Therefore, we submit that the statement of appellant in his 
brief that plaintiff received $20,000.00 in property, is wholly 
misleading and untrue. 
Inasmuch as Counsel has ·chosen to submit considerable 
material dehors the trial Court record, (e. g. "defendant un-
derstands plaintiff is working at the present . . ." App. Brief 
p. 11 - which statement is wholly untrue -) the foregoing 
statement of fact, taken entirely from the record, is 
submitted. Such extraneous and prejudcicial materials sulb-
mitted by appellant are, of course, to be accorded no probative 
value by the Appellate Court. 
We call this Honorable Court's attention to the fact that 
plaintiff has received nothing from defendant since the entry 
of this decree; that in addition thereto she has been required 
to engage counsel to respond to defendant's appeal and to 
represent her in this Court. Under the provisions of Sec. 30-3-3 
U.C.A. (1953) plaintiff should be allowed a reasonable sum with 
which to pay her counsel for his appearance in this Court. It 
is submitted that $300.00 is a reasonable sum to be allowed 
plaintiff for the use and benefit of her counsel herein. (Dahlberg 
v. Dahlberg 77 Utah 157, 292 P.214 (1930). 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that nowhere in the record does it appear that 
defendant and appelant was unfairly treated, or that there was 
any abuse of the discretionary power of the trial Court in its 
division of the property. Defendant and appellant has seen 
fit to break up this marriage with no apparent reason whatso-
t,ver other than his infatuation with another man's wife. Ap-
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pellant' s suggestion that the properties the parties had acquired 
were his own to be taken to his new wife and the interests of 
his old wife disregarded are so unconscionable as to be un-
deserving of comment. The trial Judge very carefully consid-
ered this matter and we invite this Honorable Court to examine 
his statement from the bench in reaching his ruling (Tr.57). 
In conclusion, Respondent urges this Court affirm the 
decree of the lower Court and award to plaintiff and Respondent 
herein, her costs and a reasonable attorney's fee for the use 
and benefit of her counsel. (It is suggested that $300.00 is a 
reasonable sum to be so allowed.) 
Respectfully Submitted, 
LA MAR DUNCAN, 
ADAM M. DUNCAN, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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